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UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
Prolegomena
The advantages of codifying portions of our law are
stated by a well known writer upon legal topics as
follows:
1. "To produce uniformity of law:
2. To state the law in a compendious form in which
it will be susceptible of easier reference and more exact
determination than if sought from decisions:
3. To settle uncertain questions of law without liti-
gation.
4. To harmonize into a more consistent whole a body
of doctrines, many of which have grown up, if not haphaz-
ard, at least without particular reference to one an-
other."
The history of modern codification of the common
law starts with Jeremy Bentham in England, and in the
United States with the efforts of David Dudley Field in
New York; later extended to California and other western
states through the influence of his brother, Stephen J.
Field, afterwards an associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
1Professor Samuel Williston of Harvard Law School. The Uni-
form Partnership Act, with some remarks on other uniform Com-
mercial Laws. Univ. Pa. Law Rev. Vol. 63, page 199.
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Of recent years the labors of legal scholars along
lines of codification have been devoted principally to com-
mercial branches of the law. Two powerful agencies
have assisted in the movement towards codification of
commercial law. The one is the American Bar Associa-
tion, organized in 1878, and having as one of its objects
the promotion of uniformity of legislation throughout the
Union. The other is the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, organized in 1890,
and made up of commissioners appointed by the differ-
ent states. It is a matter of interest to note in passing
that Walter George Smith, Esq., and Judge Wm. H.
Staake, both of Philadelphia, have served as Chairman of
the Committee on Commercial Law of this important
Commission. This Conference meets annually at the
same time and place as the American Bar Association. A
third factor which ought also to be mentioned in this con-
nection is the Association of American Law Schools, which
also meets annually at the same time and place.2
Says Professor Williston, supra.
"Codification has an ugly sound to most American
lawyers. We have been trained to believe that no code
can be expressed with sufficient exactness, or can be suf-
ficiently elastic to fulfil adequately the functions of our
common law. The iridescent legal utopia proposed by
Bentham and his followers, in which everyone should
readily know the law or be able quickly to find it by turn-
ing to a code, and in which the professional lawyer would
be abolished has been proved a dream. We know, today,
that law must adapt itself to changing conditions that
what is right in one time and place is not necessarily uni-
versal truth; that so long as the skein of human affairs is
full of difficult tangles the law controlling those affairs
2See article by William Schofield. Uniformity of Law as an
American Ideal. 21 Harvard Law Rev. 518. For Pa. statutes in
reference to Uniform Legislation and appointment of Commission-
ers see Act May 23, 1901, P. L. 291, Act of March 31, 1905, P. L. 91,
Act of May 8, 1909, P. L. 491, Act of May 28, 1913, P. L. 359.
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cannot be single, or understood easily by uninstructed per-
sons; that much of our law is in too vague a form to be
written down; that new cases may arise tomorrow for
which the common law will find an answer though neither
the question nor the answer could be suggested by one who
framed a code today."
In Pennsylvania, although we have not had much ex-
perience in the codification of the common law, it is a
matter of interest to recall that this Commonwealth put
forth the most ambitious as well as the earliest efforts to-
wards a comprehensive codification of its statute law.
By the provisions of a set of resolutions relative to a
revised code of Pennsylvania, passed March 23, 1830, P. L.
408, the Legislature of Pennsylvania resolved as follows:
"That the Governor be and he is hereby authorized
and required to appoint three competent persons learned
in the laws of this Commonwealth, as commissioners to
revise collate and digest all such public acts and statutes
of the civil code of this state, and all such British statutes
in force, in this state, as are general and permanent in
their nature, allotting to such commissioners their parts
respectively, as he shall deem fit: RESOLVED ALSO,
that the said commissioners shall examine, correct and ap-
prove the separate labours of each.
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that it shall be
the duty of the revisers to carefully collect and reduce into
one act, the different acts and parts of acts which from
similarity of subject ought to be so arranged and consoli-
dated; to divest the said acts of all redundant phrases and
useless verbiage; to distribute and arrange the several acts
systematically, under proper titles, divisions and sections;
to omit in the revision all such acts or parts of acts as
shall have been repealed or supplied by subsequent acts, or
which may have expired by their own limitation; to sug-
gest to the Legislature such contradictions, omissions or
imperfections, as may appear in the statutes to be revised
and the mode in which the same may be reconciled, sup-
plied or amended; to designate such acts or parts of acts
which ought to be repealed, and recommend the passage
of such new acts or parts of acts as such repeal may ren-
der necessary; and generally it shall be the duty of the re-
162 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
visers to execute the duties hereby confided to them, in
such a manner as to render the statute laws of Pennsyl-
vania more simple, plain and perfect: PROVIDED NEV-
ERTHELESS, that in: the revision and collocation of the
statutes no such change shall be made in their phraseol-
ogy by which their true intent and meaning shall in any
wise be impaired, altered or affected, except in those in-
stances in which it shall be expressly intended and pro-
posed to amend or change the existing provisions of such
statutes.
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that it shall be
the duty of the persons so appointed, together with the
duties enjoined by the preceding resolutions, to report
whether it would be expedient to introduce any, and if
any, what change in the forms and mode of proceeding in
the administration of the laws.
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the revis-
ers be and they are hereby directed to revise the several
statutes relative to the settlement of accounts before reg-
isters, and proceedings in the Orphans' Courts, as soon
as conveniently may be, and report the same for the de-
termination of the general assembly at their next session."
The Governor, George Wolf, subsequently appointed
on this commission William Rawle, Joel Jones and Thos. I.
Wharton and as every Pennsylvania lawyer knows the
labors of these men proved veritably monumental consti-
tuting as they do the groundwork of much of our substan-
tive and adjective law.3
It was in 1846 that the people of New York by the
adoption of a Constitutional Mandate, "ordered the ap-
pointment of two Commissions; one to reduce into a writ-
ten and a systematic code the whole body of the law of the
State; and the other to revise, reform, simplify and abridge
the rules and practice, pleadings, etc., of the courts of rec-
ord."
The desire to improve the law in England on com-
mercial subjects first took form in the passage by Parlia-
ment of the Bills of Exchange Act in 1882; the next step
$See Volume 21 Pa. Bar Assoc. Rep. page 14 (1915).
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in codification was the passage in 1890 of the Partnership
Act; and the third step was the enactment in 1893 of the
Sales of Goods Act.
Says Professor Williston in the article already re-
ferred to:
"All of these statutes have operated successfully in
England, and all have diminished in large measure the la-
bor of determining the law. On most questions, it is eas-
ier to obtain an answer to a question in the law of nego-
tiable paper, sales or partnership, from the brief annota-
ted statutes prepared by the authors of the acts, than it
previously was to obtain such an answer from the large
treatises which have in a great measure been rendered un-
necessary."
The Commission on Uniform Laws in the United
States prepared its first codification in 1895, having re-
quested the Committee on Commercial laws to prepare a
draft of a bill relating to commercial paper. This draft
eventually took the form of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, which was passed by our own Legislature in 1901,
see the Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194.
Since the first codification the following bills have
been drafted; The Warehouse Receipts Act, the Sales of
Goods Act, the Bills of Lading Act, the Certificates of
Stock Act, and the Partnership Act. The Commission
also has in course of preparation a bill to render uniform
the law of insurance in the various states.
Of the above drafts, the Warehouse Receipts Act
became effective in Pennsylvania in the passage of the
Act of March 11, 1909, P. L. 19, the Certificates of Stock
Act May 5, 1911, P. L. 126, the Bills of Lading Act was
approved June 9, 1911, P. L. 838, the .Partnership Act
March 26, 1915, P. L. 18, and the Sales Act May 19, 1915,
P. L. 543.
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Incongruous Elements in jPcrtnership Law
Before entering into a discussion of the provisions of
the Uniform Act it will conduce to clearer thought to re-
mind the reader of some of the inherent difficulties in the
formation of the law of partnership.
Professor Burdick sets this matter distinctly in the
following language:
"A learned writer has said: "The law of partnership
rests on a foundation composed of three materials; the
Common Law, the Law of Merchants, and the Roman
Law." It must be added that these different materials,
like the iron and the clay in the image of Nebuchadnezzar's
vision, do "not cleave one to another." Nor has English
jurisprudence yet shown its ability to assimilate them.
This diversity of materials in the very foundation of
English partnership law will constantly force itself upon
our attention as we proceed with our subject. We shall
discover, from time to time, not only a lack of affinity, but
positive repulsion between common law principles and the
usages of merchants. A single example will suffice by
way of illustration.
The law of merchants recognized a partnership as an
entity separate and distinct from the members composint,
it; such is still the mercantile conception of a firm. This
quasi person holds the title to the firm property. It ac-
quires rights and incurs obligations of its own. It may
deal even with its own members, thus becoming their cred-
itor or debtor. But the common law flouts all such no-
tions. It refuses to personify the firm. A partnership
is but an association of individuals. It cannot contract
with its members, because a man cannot contract with
himself. To this conflict of views is due much of the con-
fusion and perplexity which characterize some of the
branches of our partnership law."14
Divergent Views .of Nature of Partnership
Mr. Shumaker, in his work on the Law of Partner-
ship, discussing the nature of partnership says:
'Burdick on Partnership, page 2.
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"Everyone is familiar with the legal fiction by which
a corporation is regarded as a legal person lor entity sepa-
rate and distinct from its members or stockholders. The
property, rights, duties, and obligations of a corporation
are not the property, rights, duties and obligations of the
stockholders. With a partnership, the case is exactly re-
versed. The firm, as such, is not regarded as having any
legal existence apart from the members who compose it.":,
The prevailing view, therefore, concerning the nature
of a partnership is that it is merely an association of in-
dividuals and called the "association theory."
The entity or legal fiction view is well expressed by
our Mr. Justice Williams in Clarke v. Railroad Company,
when he says:
"The partnership when formed is a distinct person in
law. It has its own name, its own property, and a right
to contract, to sue and be sued by its firm name. The
names of the persons who compose the firm should be
stated on the record as descriptive of it, and to enable the
court to take care of the rights of the parties growing out
of cross-demands and the like; but the cause of action as-
serted in the firm name must belong to the firm as such.
Joint tenants and tenants in common have several titles to
an undivided moiety. Their possession is in common be-
cause the share of one has not been separated from that
of the others, but the title of each is to the property held
in common, and is for a definite part of it. Partners have
no title to the partnership property for the title vests in
the firm, and the interest of each member is a resulting
interest, the value of which can only be ascertained by an
account."8
A third view of the nature of a firm has been of-
fered by Professor James Parsons in his Principles of Part-
nership. According to his view, partnership is a status
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"The sum, of the rights and duties of the partners in
the relation is called the status of partnership. The status
may be created by contract, like marriage or sale. The
contract is the occasion or door, and the consummation or
conveyance establishes rights in rem." "Though partner-
ship may be dissolved at will and the relation brought to a
close through the act of the individual, yet the status,
with all its attendant duties and prerogatives, subsists un-
til it is terminated in a manner consistent with its original
purpose." "The elevation of partnership into a status is
due to the presence of a firm estate." "The partners, be-
ing merged as individuals in the firm estate, are enabled
to trade in a distinct capacity." "The only qualification
is that in acting as partners they bind their separate es-
tates, and the firm creditor is not confined to the firm
fund." "It is the recognition by the law of the estate
that severs the partner from himself as a man."17
The above author rejects the mercantile or fiction
theory and queries:
"What is the polarity of mind of a lawyer who advo-
cates making a partnership by turns a corporation and a
number of individuals? If he comprehended the elemen-
tal distinction of kind, he would not expose his confusion
by making the suggestion, but he would disguise the pro-
position in the jargon of lawyers who speak of a man
quo modo, a horse."
The Uniform Act
The Uniform Act was passed by the recent tegisla-
ture and approved by the Governor, the 26th day of March,
1915, being known as number 15, An Act relating to and
regulating Partnerships. P. L. 18.
Dr. William Draper Lewis, late Dean, and now a pro-
fessor in the Law Department of the University of Penn-
sylvania, has this to say concerning the origin of the Uni-
form Act:
"Several years ago the Conference on Uniform State
Laws directed its Committee on Commercial Law to pre-
7Principles of Partnership (lst ed.) 286, 287.
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pare the draft of an act to make uniform the Law of Part-
nership. The Committee committed the preliminary .prep-
aration of the draft to the late Mr. James Barr Ames,
Dean of the Law School of Harvard University. Mr.
Ames sought and procured permission to draft the Act on
what is usually called the entity theory of partnership,
and, at the time of his death the Committee were consid-
ering a draft prepared by him on that theory.
On the death of Mr. Ames, at the suggestion of in-
dividual members of the Committee, the writer submitted
two drafts; one prepared on the so-called entity theory,
and the other on the so-called aggregate theory of the
nature of the partnership. In the preparation of these
drafts, and of the last draft hereafter referred to, the
writer has had associated with him Mr. James B. Lichten-
berger, one time Gowen Memorial Fellow of the Law
School of the University of Pennsylvania, and a member
of the Philadelphia Bar. The two drafts first submitted
by the writer and Mr. Lichtenberger were considered by
the Committee at the meeting held at Chattanooga, Tenn.,
in August, 1910, and again at the meeting held in Phila-
delphia last February. 1911. The Committee invited to
attend its meeting in Philadelphia a number of judges, law
teachers, practicing members of the bar, and representa-
tives of commercial bodies. A number of recognized ex-
perts on the law of partnership from different parts of the
country were present. The opening session was devoted
to the discussion of the rival theories of the nature of a
partnership, the object being to enable the Committee to
determine whether they should proceed with a detailed dis-
cussion of the draft drawn on the entity theory or that
drawn on the azgregate theory. At the conclusion of the
discussion, on the unanimous recommendation of those
present, the Committee proceeded to examine the draft pre-
pared on the aggregate theory, and subsequently passed a
resolution directing me to prepare another draft on that
theory for the further consideration of the Committee."'
sThe Desirability of Exrtressing the law of Partnership in Statu-
tory Form, University of Pa. Law Rev., Volume 60 page 93. For
further discussion of the theory of partnership and the Uniform Act.
see article by Williston, 63 Univ. Pa. Law Review 196; article by Jud-
son A. Crane, 28 Harv. Law Rev. 762; reply to Mr. Crane by Lewis,
29 Harv. Law Review, 158; article by Lewis in 24 Yale Law Journal
617.
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This draft constitutes the base of the present act, hav-
ing been subjected to much scrutiny and discussion, con-
tinuing over several years and finally culminating in the
following resolution adopted by the Conference on Uniform
State Laws at Washington, D. C., October 14, 1914.
"Resolved, that the eighth tentative draft of an act
to make uniform the law of partnership be, and the same
is, hereby approved by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and it is recommended to the
legislatures of all of the states for adoption by them."
This last draft is the one which constitutes our Act
of the 26th of March, 1915.
In discussing the Uniform Act, we will call attention
to its general scope and extent and later take up particular
provisions wherein there has been a change in the law of
partnership in this State as it had been evolved by our
courts or modified by legislative enactment.
Subdivisions
The Act is entitled "An Act relating to and regulating
Partnership," and consists of seven parts, the latter in
turn embracing a total of forty-six sections, as follows:
Part 1. Preliminary Provisions in five sections.
Part II. Nature of a Partnership in three sections.
Part III. Relations of Partners to Persons dealing
with the Partnership in seven sections.
Part IV. Relations of Partners to One Another in
six sections.
Part V. Property Rights of a Partner in five sec-
tions.
Part VI. Dissolution and Winding Up in fifteen sec-
tions.
Part VII. Miscellaneous Provisions in three sections
giving the time when the act is to go into effect, and pro-
viding for the repeal of specific acts and parts of acts,
likewise provisions setting forth the specific fact that cer-
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tain acts and parts of acts are not repealed by the act un-
der discussion.
General Remarks
Professor Williston has this to say concerning the
chief difficulties in the law of partnership which are met
by the provisions of the Uniform Act:9
"The two principal difficulties in the administration
of partnership law under existing decisions arise from:
1. The right of a partner as joint owner in specific
partnership property; and,
2. The settlement of the claims of different classes
of creditors when the business is continued but the per-
sonnel of the partnership changes.
In the Uniform Partnership Act the first difficulty
is solved, not by asserting that the partnership as an
entity owns the specific property, but by treatinz the part-
ners as holding the property by a special kind of tenancy-
tenancy in partnership, and defining the incidents of that
tenancy in such a way as to meet the difficulties of the
problem. Joint tenancy and its incidents were doubtless
created by custom, and by the courts, to meet the practical
necessities that were felt in co-ownership of feudal Estates.
Difficulties have arisen in the law of partnership by trying
to fit the incidents of a kind of co-ownership which arose out
of different conditions into the situation which arises in
partnership. By giving appropriate incidents to tenancy
in partnership the draftsman of the act has avoided possi-
bilities of confusion and impractical results, without mak-
ing a fundamental change in existing law.
Thus the interest of a partner in a specific piece of
property belonging to the firm is not subject to attach-
ment in the Uniform Act, nor can a partner assign his in-
terest in such a piece of property except in connection
with an assignment of rights of all the partners in that
property.
The second difficulty in the administration of part-
nership law has been met by recognizing the fact that a
business may be a single and continuing business though
OThe Uniform Partnership Act, University of Pa. Law Review,
Volume 63 page 211.
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an additional member of the firm may be taken in or one
of the original members dropped out. The act provides
that when a business is continued without liquidation,
though the personnel of the firm conducting the business
may change, all the creditors of the different partnerships
are creditors of the partnership which continues the busi-
ness and all have an equal right in the property embarked
in the business. Under the existing law that property be-
longs to the last firm, which results in extreme hardship
to the creditors who have extended credit before the last
change in the personnel of the firm. Courts have en-
deavored to modify this hardship by declaring in many
cases that the transfer of the property to the last firm was
in fraud of the creditors of the preceding firm. The re-
sulting practical situation has been one of extreme doubt
where it has been hitherto and it still is extremely difficult
to determine the rights of the various creditors."
The learned draftsman sets forth the following points
of merit in the Act :10
"The merit of the proposed Act depends upon: First:
Whether it states the law in simple, clear language; Sec-
ond: The extent to which it renders certain existing un-
certainties; Third: Whether the changes which it intro-
duces into the law are beneficial."
The Committee on Commercial Law of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have issued a
copy of the Uniform Act with Explanatory Notes under
date of October 14, 1914, at which time the final draft of
the Act was adopted. This copy of the Act is prefaced
by an Introductory Note in which, inter alia, the follow-
ing observation is made :11
"Uniformity of the law of partnerships is constantly
becoming more important, as the number of firms in-
10The Uniform Partnership Act by William Draper Lewis, Vol-
ume 24, Yale Law Journal, page 621.
"
1The Uniform Partnership Act with Explanatory Notes, page 5.
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creases which not only carry on business in more than
one state, but have among the members residents of dif-
ferent states.
It is, however, proper here to emphasize the fact that
there are other reasons, in addition to the advantages
which will result from uniformity, for the adoption of the
act now issued by the commissioners. There is probably
no other subject connected with our business law in which
a greater number of instances can be found where, in
matters of almost daily occurrence, the law is uncertain.
This uncertainty is due, not only to conflict between the
decisions of different states, but more to the general lack
of consistency in legal theory. In several of the sections,
but especially in those which relate to the rights of the
partner and his separate creditors in partnership prop-
erty, and to the rights of firm creditors where the per-
sonnel of the partnershin has been chaneed without liqui-
dation of partnership affairs, there exists an almost hope-
less confusion of theory and practice, making the actual
administration of the law difficult and often inequitable.
Another difficulty of the present partnership law is
the scarcity of authority on matters of considerable impor-
tance in the daily conduct and in the winding up of part-
nership affairs. In'any one state it is often impossible to
find an authority on a matter of comparatively frequent
occurrence, while not infrequently an exhaustive research
of the reports of the decisions of all the states and the
federal courts fails to reveal a single authority throwing
light on the question. The existence of a statute stating
in detail the rights of the partners inter se during the
carrying on of the partnership business, and on the wind-
ing up of partnership affairs, will be a real practical ad-
vantage of moment to the business world."
Nature of a Partnership
It has already been pointed out that three divergent
views of a partnership have been held by judges and law
writers, viz: The common law or aggregate theory, the mer-
cantile or legal person theory and the status theory.
Much time was expended by the Committee in deter-
mining which theory ought to be followed in the Uniform
Act,
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Section 6 provides as follows:
1. "A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.
2. But any association formed under any other stat-
ute of this State, or any statute adopted by authority, other
than the authority of this State, is not a partnership under
this act, unless such association would have been a partner-
ship in this State prior to the adoption of this act; but this
act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as
the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent
herewith."
Much space has been devoted in the magazine articles
cited concerning the theory of partnership which has been
adopted by the language of the Act. The learned drafts-
man and the Committee apparently are of the opinion that
the common law theory has been adopted. To this assump-
tion Mr. Judson A. Crane in his article in the June number
1915 of Harvard Law Review takes serious exception and
argues that the legal person theory or so called mercantile
view should have been adopted and in fact has been uncon-
sciously recognized in the very terms of the act.
It apnears to the writer that the true version of the
matter is that neither the aggregate or common law theory
nor the leaal person theory has actually been adopted but
that without really giving credit the terms of the act aire
only exnlicable by a reference to the status theory already
referred to12 as advanced by Professor Parsons.
Professor Williston in one of his articles13 reaches
practicall.v the same conclusion although giving credit to the
entity or legal person theory in this language:
"But tho,,oh the entity thporv as a looicalyv consisttent
thenry i not followed in the Uniform Paritership Act. the
ruair advantatres of that theorv are nevertheless attAired;
the chief reason for the ponularity of the eptity view is that
it avoids certain difficulties into which the common law
12See note 7, supra.
"University of Pa. Law Review, volume 63, page 210.
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has floundered in dealing with the partnership property,
especially with reference to creditors."
Section 8 of the Act provides as follows:
1. "All property originally brought into the partner-
ship stock or subsequently acquired, by purchase or other-
wise, on account of the partnership, is partnership prop-
erty.
2. Unless the contrary intention appears, property
acquired with partnership funds is partnership property.
3. Any estate in real property may be acquired in the
partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only
in the partnership name.
4. A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership
name, though without words of inheritance, passes the en-
tire estate of the grantor unless a contrary intent appears."
Mr. Crane in considering the above section argues that
its language would seem to make the partnership as such
the subject of rights, and thus a legal person. He refers
to cases in which the right has been denied to take legal ti-
tle to real estate in the partnerihip name, the ratio deciden-
di being that only a legal person can take a title to real es-
tate and that the partnership was not a legal person.
Section 10 subdivision 1 provides as follows:
'Where title to real property is in the partnership
name any partner may convey title to such property by
a conveyance executed in the partnership name; but the
partnership may recover such property unless the partner's
act binds the partnership under the provisions of para-
graph 1 of section nine, or unless such property has been
conveyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such
grantee to a holder for value, without knowledge that the
partner, in making the conveyance, has exceeded his au-
thority."
In this same connection sections 24, 25 and 26 may be
quoted and they read as follows:
"Section 24. The property rights of a partner are
(1) his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his
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interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate
in the management.
Section 25. (1) A partner is co-owner with his part-
ners of specific partnership property, holding as a tenant
in partnership.
(2). The incidents of this tenancy are such that:(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this act
and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal
right with his partners to possess specific partnership
property for partnership purposes; but he has no right to
possess such property for any other purpose without the
consent of his partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership proper-
ty is not assignable, except in connection with the assign-
ment of the rights of all partners in the same property.(c) A Partner's rivht in specific partnershiD proper-
tv is not subject to attachment or execution, except on
claim against the partnership. When partnership prop-
erty is attached for a partnership debt, the partners, or any
of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, can-
not claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific
partnership property vests in the surviving partner or part-
ners, except where his right in such property vests in his
legal representative. Such surviving partner or part-
ners, or the leral representative of the last surviving part-
ner, has no right to possess the partnership property for
any but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership proper-
ty is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows,
heirs, or next of kin.
Section 26. A partner's interest in the partnership is
his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is per-
sonal property."
The legal and practical result of the aforegoing sec-
tions may be shown, in large part, by the following illus-
trations.
A, B, & C associate themselves as partners to carry on
in Carlisle and vicinity the business of buying land and sell-
ing the same in bulk or by subdivision. The firm does bus-
iness under the name and style of Carlisle Land Company.
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Each member of the firm contributes the sum of $10,000
to capital. Of the total capital $30,000, the sum of $20,000
is used in acquiring a tract of land to be subdivided into
building lots. The $10,000 remaining is devoted as work-
ing capital for the development of the tract. The legal title
to the land is taken in the name of Carlisle Land Company.
A, B & C are recognized under the sections quoted as
the legal owners of the land, holding the title to the same,
however, as tenants in partnership, using the name of Car-
lisle Land Company as a convenient designation of what
Dean Lewis calls the grouping of activities"4 but which ap-
pears to be simply another way of arriving at Professor
Parson's theory already alluded to. There is no recogni-
tion by the law of the Carlisle Land Company as an entity
or legal person but there is, by virtue of the association of
A, B & C as partners, a distinct stamp placed upon the
partnership property or to put it directly there is a peculiar
status or condition placed upon the partners in their rela-
tion to the partnership property and their rights therein.
The partner can only deal with the partnership property
for partnership purposes. Furthermore, a partner's sepa-
rate creditor cannot affect the specific partnership proper-
ty and on the death of a partner his right in the specific
partnership property becomes extinct, the legal title vest-
ing solely in the survivor. Thus there is no subject mat-
ter upon which any dower, curtesy or other right of wid-
ows, husbands, heirs or next of kin can attach in the case of
real estate. A fee simple title is vested by the terms of
the statute without the use of words of inheritance and if it
is desired that a lot of ground be conveyed this may be done
by any one of the partners executing and acknowledging
in the name of the partnership a deed of conveyance. This
occurs by virtue of the terms of Section 9, (1) as follows:
"Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
1429 Harv. L. Rev. 158.
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purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, includ-
ing the execution in the partnership name of any instru-
ment, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the busi-
ness of the partnership of which he is a member binds the
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no au-
thority to act for the partnership in the particular matter,
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of
the fact that he has no such authority."
And the provisions of Section 10 (1) already quoted.
Let us suppose in the illustration that A becomes sep-
arately indebted. What remedy has his creditor against
his interest in the partnership?
As already seen the corpus of the partnership estate is
immune from attacks of the separate creditors of the re-
spective partners.
Sec. 28, (1) provides:
"On due application to a competent court by any judg-
ment creditor of a partner, the court which entered thejudgment, order or decree, or any other court, may charge
the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the un-
satisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest there-
on; and may then or later appoint a receiver of his share
of the profits, and of any other money due or to fall due to
him in respect of the partnership, and make all other
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor
partner might have made, or which the circumstances of
the case may require."
Let us suppose in the illustration given that the part-
nership is to continue for five years and C dies before the
end of the term, thus working a dissolution of the firm.
Section 38, (1) provides:
"When dissolution is caused in any way, except in con-
travention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as
against his co-partners and all persons claiming through
them in respect of their interests in the partnership, un-
less otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied
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to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective part-
ners."
The legal title to the firm property would devolve upon
A and B and they would be the liquidating partners. Their
duty would be to reduce the partnership estate to cash, pay
the debts, advances by partners, return to each partner or
his representative the capital contributed and divide the
surplus as profits.
Again let us suppose that partner B sells out to X and
the business is continued by A, X and C and let it be further
imagined that C sells out to Y and the business is continued
by A, X and Y. The latter firm goes into insolvency.
There are creditors of the original firm A, B and C, also
of A, X and C, and of A, X and Y.
How shall the creditors participate?
See. 41, (1) provides:
"When any new partner is admitted into an existing
partnership, or when any partner retires and assigns (or
the representative of the deceased partner assigns) his
rights in partnership property to two or more of the part-
ners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more
third persons, if the business is continued without liquida-
tion of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first or dis-
solved partnership are also creditors of the partnership so
continuing the business."
From the aforegoing excerpts and illustrations it is ap-
parent that the general theory of partnership as hitherto
held in Pennsylvania remains the same, for the entity view
of Mr. Justice Williams as expressed in Clarke v. Railroad
Co., supra. can not be said to represent the prevailing
doctrine25 The partners, as individuals are recognized as
owning collectively the assets of the business and for the
purpose of carrying forward uninterruptedly the object of
its formation.
2
,Furthermore, the remarks were dicta. See 29 Harv. L. Rev.
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Says the learned draftsman in the note to Sec. 25. (1):
"One of the present principal difficulties in the admin-
istration of the law of partnerships arises out of the dif-
ficulty of determining the exact nature of the rights of a
partner in specific partnership property. That the part-
ners are co-owners of partnership property is clear; but
the legal incidents attached to the right of each partner as
co-owner are not clear. When the English courts in the
seventeenth century first began to discuss the legal inci-
dents of this co-ownership, they were already familiar with
two other kinds of co-ownership, joint tenancy and tenancy
in common. In joint tenancy on the death of one owner his
right in the property passes to the other co-owners. This
is known as the right of survivorship. The incident of
survivorship fits in with the necessities of partnership. On
the death of a partner, the other partners and not the ex-
ecutors of the deceased partner should have a right to wind
up partnership affairs. (See Clause (d), infra). The
early courts, therefore, declared that partners were joint
tenants of partnership property, the consequence being that
all the other legal incidents of joint tenancy were applied
to partnership co-ownership. , Many of these incidents,
however, do not apply to the necessities of the partnership
relation and produce most inquitable results. This is not
to be wondered at because the legal incidents of joint ten-
dency grew out of a co-ownership of land not held for the
purposes of business. The attempt of our courts to es-
cape the inequitable results of applying the legal incidents
of joint tenancy to partnership has produced very great
confusion. Practically this confusion has had a more un-
fortunate effect on substantive rights when the separate
creditors of a partner attempt to attach and sell specific
partnership property, than when a partner attempts to as-
sign specific partnership property, not for a partnership
purpose but for his own purposes."
Let us examine a few Pennsylvania cases which will
throw light on the provisions of the Uniform Act above
quoted.
In Foster's Appeals the question presented to the
2674 Pa. 391, per Sharswood, T.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 179
Court was: when real estate has been held as partnership
stock, the firm dissolved by the death of one of the mem-
bers,, a settlement and balance ascertained to be due by
the surviving partner to the estate of the deceased, is such
balance as far as derived from the sale of the realty to
be distributed as real or personal estate?
The widow of the deceased partner as appellant claim-
ed one third absolutely as personal estate. Held, that the
balance was to be considered as real estate. It was even said
in this case that the surviving partner as such could not sell
the real estate in conjunction with the personalty.
Says the Court:
"As regards the power of disposition, land held as
partnership stock is not subject to the rule which makes
each partner the agent of the firm."
In Leaf's Appeal 7 A and others formed a partner
ship to engage in the iron business. The articles of part-
nership stipulated that death should not dissolve the firm
but that dissolution should only occur by the consent of
all the members. A died, intestate, leaving a widow and
children. Held, that the widow took a one-third interest
absolutely, at least, during the existence of the firm.
Concerning the contention that the deceased partner's
interest was real estate, the Court said:
"Whenever a dissolution shall be established, and a
final settlement of accounts shall take place, the posi-
tions contended for, and the reasoning by which they are
enforced, will become entirely applicable, and will exer-
cise a very potent and possibly a controlling influence, up-
on the questions which will then arise between the pres-
ent litigants or those who may succeed them."
According to the above ruling and Foster's Appeal,
supra, the estate of A could not be finally settled until the
dissolution of the firm and on the other hand if upon dig-
17105 Pa. 505.
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solution and settlement of the firm's accounts a balance in
the form of real estate remained, the widow and heirs of
A would have to join the surviving partners in a deed of
conveyance in order to give a good title.
In Account of C. H. Welles, 8 it was held that where all
the assets of the partnership were sold by consent of all
the partners, a balance on settlement of accounts being
in the shape of real estate, nevertheless, for purposes of
distribution in the estate of a deceased partner, was to
pass as real estate despite its sale.
The questions in the above cases are now settled by
Sections 25, 26 and 38 (1) above quoted. One of the
most perplexing and serious problems in the law of part-
nership involving the rights of separate creditors of the
partners in cases of execution and levy upon the shares of
the partners in the firm property is illustrated in the well
known case of Doner v. Stauffer." The curious results
reached by following the reasoning of Justice Gibson in
this case have long annoyed the legal profession. The
cases under the special fi. fa Act of April 8, 1873,20 did
not clarify matters.
Says Dean Lewis: 21
"Thus, in Pennsylvania, prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Act, the sheriff, at the instance of the separate
judgment creditor of the partner, would levy on the deb-
tor partner's interest in the specific partnership property
attached, and sell this "interest," the purchaser having a
right to a bill in equity to obtain, not what the sheriff had
sold, which was the debtor partner's interest in specific
partnership property, but the debtor partner's interest in
the business of the partnership. See Act of April 8, 1873,
Pepper & Lewis Dig. of Laws, 5620. Besides its incon-
18191 Pa. 239.
191 P. & W. 198. See also 10 Dickinson Forum 25, Vol. 15, P. &
L. Dig. Dec. Col. 25860.
20P. L. 65, P. & L. Dig. of Laws, 5620.
2129 Harv. L. Rev. 163.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sistency, the practical injustice resulting from this pro-
cedure was that it required a sale of the debtor partner's
interest in the partnership before an account was had to
ascertain the value of the interest. Possible purchasers,
being offered something whose value was highly specula-
tive, usually refused to bid, with the result that the inter-
est was bought in by the judgment creditor."
The difficulties outlined are now solved by Section
28 of the Uniform Act.
Section 17 provides as follows:
"A person admitted as a partner into an existing part-
nership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership
arising before his admission as though he had been a part-
ner when such obligations were incurred, except that this
liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property."
Section 41 (1) provides as follows:
"When any new partner is admitted into an existing
partnership, or. when any partner retires and assigns (or
the representative of the deceased partner assigns) his
rights in partnership property to two or more of the part-
ners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more
third persons, if the business is continued without liqui-
dation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first or
dissolved partnership are also creditors of the partnership
so continuing the business."
These sections of the Act change the law in Pennsylva-
nia2 2 , and it is believed will produce more equitable results
among different sets of creditors of successive partner-
ships which have been continued without liquidation.
Test of Partnership
One of the great difficulties in the law of partnership
in the past has been to determine exactly when a partner-
22Frow, Jacobs & Co.'s Estate, 73 Pa. 459. Baker's Appeal, 21
Pa. 76. See also remarks of Willison under note 8 su;ra.
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ship was formed.2 3 This is purely a question of fact, and
yet in the past the courts have proposed tests of a very ar-
bitrary nature for determining this fact.
One of the tests has been the sharing in the profits of
the partnership.
The common law of Pennsylvania heretofore on this
subject and the statutory change are well set forth in the
following remarks of Mr. Justice Fell in Wessels v. Weiss.2'
"The agreement between the defendants made them
partners at common law and in this state. The case of
Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Blackstone, 235, decided in 1793,
which followed Grace v. Smith, 2 Win. Blackstone, 998,
decided in 1775, was followed and adopted to its full ex-
tent in Purviance v. McClintee, 6 S. & R. 259, in 1820. The
well settled rule of Waugh v. Carver was overruled in Env-
land in 1860 by the case of Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C.
268, but there has been no departure from it in this state
except by legislation in 1870.
This rule has been so long established as a part of our
jurisprudence that it is needless now to consider whether
it is philosophical and in harmony with the principles gov-
erning the partnership relation. The departure from it in
this state-and it was doubtless the wiser course-has been
by legislation. The act of April 6, 1870, provides that a
loan of money to an individual or a firm upon an agree-
ment to receive a share of the profits of the business as
compensation for the use of the money and in lieu of in-
terest shall not make the party loaning the money liable
as a partner except as to the money loaned, provided that
the agreement for the loan shall be in writing and that
the party shall not hold himself out as a general partner.
This legislation distinctly recognized the rule as it had ex-
isted in this state for fifty years and in England from
1775 to 1860, and modified it to conform more nearly to
the modern English rule of Cox v. Hickman, supra."
23To illustrate this difficulty, see Dunham v. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255;
Hart v. Kelley, 83 Pa. 286, In re Gibbs' Estate, 157 Pa. 59; Fourth
Street National Bank v. Whitaker, 170 Pa. 297.
24166 Pa. 494.
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The above law is changed by the provisions of sec-
tion 7 of the Act and the general question is clarified as
much as possible.
Section 7 reads as follows:
"In determining whether a partnership exists, these
rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by section 16 persons who
are not partners as to each other are not partners as to
third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by
the entireties, joint property, common property, or part
ownership does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons shar-
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived.
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits
of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner
in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if
such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a
deceased partner.(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of pay
ment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good-
will of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise."
Powers of Partners
Section 9 of the Act sets forth the powers of partners
acting as agents of the partnership and as to partnership
business.
The section reads as follows:
"Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, in-
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eluding the execution in the partnership name of any in-
strument for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member binds
the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact
no authority to act for the partnership in the particular
matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowl-
edge of the fact that he has no such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently
for the carrying on of the business of the partnership in
the usual way does not bind the partnership unless au-
thorized by the other partners.
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or un-
less they have abandoned the business, one or more but
less than all the partners have no afithority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for
creditors or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts of
the partnership.
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business.
(c) Do any other act which would make it imuos-
sible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership.
(d) Confess a judgment.
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbi-
tration or reference.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a re-
striction on his authority shall bind the partnership to
persons having knowledge of the restriction."
The section, it will be observed, ignores the distinc-
tion between trading and nontrading partnerships which
has been generally recognized in England and in most
American jurisdctons.25
This distinction, however, was repudiated by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Hoskinson v.
Eliot. Said the Court: 2
"No such distinction is suggested or recognized in any
adjudicated cases or text books, and there is no foundation
for it in the necessities or usages of these partnerships.
The necessity for borrowing money to carry on the busi-
2Burdick on Partnership, 193.
2862 Pa. 393.
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ness of a manufacturing partnership may be as great as
it is in order to carry on the business of one that is strict-
ly commercial."
The test for determining the implied authority of a
partner is reduced to the question of fact was the act as
performed apparently for the carrying on in the usual way
of the business of the partnership.
As to the acts which are specifically denied as a part
of the implied authority of the partner, the law of Penn-
sylvania previous to the passage of this Act was in ac-
cord except as to subdivisions (d) and (e).
In Grier v. Hood27 and in subsequent cases, it has been
held that a judgment may be confessed for a partnership
debt by one member of a firm, without the consent of the
other members, and if the property of the firm be sold
under an execution issued upon such judgment, the pur-
chaser will take a good title.
It was also held in Gay v. Waltman28 that one part-
ner could bind his co-partners by submission to arbitration,
not under seal, in any partnership matter.
Says Mr. Justice Mercur in the above case:
"The general rule in England and in many of our sis-
ter states, is that one partner cannot bind his co-partner
by submission to arbitration. In Pennsylvania it is held
that he may so bind his co-partner, by agreement not un-
der seal, in any partnership matter."
The provisions of Section 10, subdivision 1, relative to
the powers of partners over firm real estate held in the
partnership and their authority to convey have been al-
ready quoted and discussed. The provisions mark a radi-
cal change in our local law. Subdivision 2 of this same
section may likewise be noted in this connection.
2725 Pa. 430; Evans v. Watts, 192 Pa. 112; Adams v. Leeds Co.,
195 Pa. 70.
2889 Pa. 453.
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Dissolution
The subject of dissolution and winding up of part-
nerships occupies quite a space in the Uniform Act, there
being devoted to these subjects fifteen out of the total
of forty-six sections of the Act.
Much matter of uncertainty in the law has been re-
duced to certainty in these sections and some of the prin-
ciples, especially those where a person was compelled to
"take notice" of the dissolution, have been changed to more
equitable conclusions.
Special note may be made of the adoption in para-
graph (2) of Section 31 of the principle set forth in our
own cases of Mason v. Connell 29 and Slemmer's Appeal,30
holding that a partner may dissolve the partnership in con-
travention of the term agreement between the partners but
suffer the penalty in damages for so doing.
Conclusion
The primary object of this article has been to bring
the Uniform Act more closely to the attention of the stu-
dent body and by reference to certain features of the Act
and some discussion of the principles of partnership law
therein set forth to thus stimulate further research and
study upon the part of the reader.
This discussion does not purport to be an exhaustive
treatment of the Act. Many sections and paragraphs
have been left untouched. Some questions which will in-
evitably arise in the construction of the Act by the Courts
have been in mind and may be treated in subsequent ar-
ticles.
As far as Pennsylvania law is concerned, the Act pro-
vides some very welcome changes which will undoubtedly
291 Wharton, 381.
3058 Pa. 168.
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make partnership law more workable and more in accord
with commercial thought.
No doubt there are defects in the Act. No attempt
has been made, however, to disclose any defects.
We may conclude this article with the language of the
severest critic the Act has had-, who closed his criticisms
with this declaration:
"The Act contains, nevertheless, many commendable
features, which cannot because of lack of space be enum-
erated."'
A. J. WHITE HUTTON.
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HAROLD'S ESTATE
Decedent's Estates - Husband and Wife - Husband's Possession of
Wife's Property-Presumptions
Massenger, for the appellant.
Hibbard, for the appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PANNELL, J. From the facts in this case, it appears that one
Harold had received, with the consent of his wife from her father's
executor the sum of $1000, which was in payment of a legacy to her.
Prior to his death, Harold had issued 40 checks, varying in amounts
from $5 to $100, to his wife, which the distributees allege, partially
paid the debt, if there was one, to the extent of $740. In the dis-
tribution of the estate by the Orphans' Court, the wife was allowed
$1000 with interest from the time the husband received the money.
The first question which presents itself, is whether the husband,
by the receipt of his wife's money, and with her consent, thereby
created the relationship of debtor and creditor, or that of donor and
donee. Prior to the Act of 1848, the wife had no separate and inde-
pendent personal estate. The freedom of disposition of it was lim-
ited, encumbered, and bound by that arbitrary rule of the common
law which made her property that of her husband. The common
law gave him this right as incident to the marriage relation. Clever-
stene's Appeal, 15 Pa. 499. But after the Act of 1848, there was a
difference. The receipt of the money by the husband rested upon
an opposite presumption. As the law made the money hers, it pre-
sumed it to have been received for her. So full was her right and
dominion over it that she might have loaned it to her husband and
his estate would have had to pay it. It is quite evident, therefore,
that prior to the Act of 1848, the wife had less power and dominion
over her estate than subsequent thereto. "In the first period the
presumption is that the husband has received the money under and
by virtue of his marital relation as his own; in the second, the pre-
sumption is the opposite, that he received it for his wife, the act of
assembly having declared it hers, and for her sole and separate use."
Wormley's Estate, 137 Pa. 109.
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The money which the wife was to receive from her father's exe-
cutor was undoubtedly part of her sole and separate estate, over
which she had exclusive control and dominion. Although she con-
sented to the receipt of it by her husband, still there was no other
evidence which either affirmed or denied that he received it as a
gift or a loan. Since the husband received his wife's money, the
presumption is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, that
he received it as a loan. Strock's Estate, 56 Super. 32; Hawley v.
Griffith, 187 Pa. 309; Hamill's Appeal, 88 Pa. 367; Wormley's Estate,
137 Pa. 109; Krider v. Hartzell, 40 Super. 193; Young's Estate, 65
Pa. 104; Johnston v. Johnston, 31 Pa. 454. For "the mere fact of
the reception of the wife's money by her husband, makes him her
debtor and it requires no affirmative proof by the wife that he re-
ceived it as a loan and not as a gift. On the contrary, if it is alleged
afterwards, whether by the husband's heirs or by his creditors that the
money was received as a gift, and not as a loan, the burden is upon
those who make such allegation to prove it." Wormley's Estate,
137 Pa. 109. But the distributees have not shown any agreement to
the contrary nor any evidence rebutting the presumption and justi-
fying, even as inference that it was a gift and not a loan. Conse-
quently, Harold by the receipt of the $1000 in question -made himself
liable as a debtor to his wife for that amount.
Even though the estate of Harold is indebted to the wife for the
sum of $1000, still the distributees contend that the debt has been re-
duced by the amounts of the several checks given to the wife. They
urge that they were payments on the debt and that such is the pre-
sumption, unless the same is overcome. The general rule is that when
a check is drawn by one person in favor of another and paid to the
latter, the presumption is that it was received on account of a debt
shown to have existed at the time, and that the person alleging that
it was not so received must offer proof to overcome the presump-
tion. Strock's Estate, 56 Super. 35; Masser v. Bowen, 29 Pa. 128;
Flemming v. McClain, 13 Pa. 177.
To the general class of cases involving such contested point, this
rule is applicable. However, it should be limited to those controver-
sies in which strangers are concerned and should not be invoked
where an intimate relationship exists as between husband and wife.
From the facts of this case, the checks ranged in amounts from $5
to $100 and were 40 in number. When we consider both the amounts
and the number of the checks, it is altogether plausible to conclude
that they were given to the wife for the support and maintenance of
the household. Surely, it would not be reasonable to presume that
every time a husband advanced money to his wife, under conditions
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similar to these in the present case, that he was making a loan to
her or paying off some past indebtedness, and this is especially true
when the husband and wife are living together. But even if they
are not living together, the presumption is the same, and perhaps
there is all the more reason to presume a gift, for such action would
tend to show the interest of the husband in the support and main-
tenance of his household. Consequently, "the intimate relationship
of the parties and the generally recognized mode of dealing between
husband and wife, justifies the presumption that the delivery of
property by the husband was intended as a gift rather than the pay-
ment of a debt." Strock's Estate, 56 Super. 35. See also Wilson
v. Silknan, 97 Pa. 509; Sparks v. Harley, 208 Pa. 166.
This rule applies to both personalty and realty and where a
husband transfers either real or personal property to his wife, the
presumption is that it is a gift from him to her." Waslee v. Ross-
man, 231 Pa. 228.
It does not appear that the distributees have rebutted the pre-
sumption, that these advances made to his wife, were gifts rather than
loans. Therefore, they have not established their contention that
the debt has been reduced by the amounts of the checks given to the
wife.
After finding that the wife had a valid claim against the estate
of her husband for $1000 and that the checks given to the wife were
gifts and not loans, consequently not diminishing the amount of the
indebtedness, the Court allowed the wife interest on the amount from
the time the husband received the money. This was error, for as a
general rule, when the wife permits her husband to use her money
without any stipulation as to the terms and continues to live with
him, the presumption is that the interest was used to support the
family and she is entitled to a return of the principal and not the
interest also. Hawley v. Griffith, 187 Pa. 309; Hauer's Estate, 140
Pa. 425.
It does not appear that the wife made any demand for interest
until the bringing of this suit, and there was no agreement to the
effect that interest should be paid; consequently, she could not re-
cover any interest during the lifetime of her husband. For as stated
in MeGlensey's Appeal, 14 S. & R. 66, "Where a wife permits her
husband to receive the profits of her separate estate, and particu-
larly where they live together and the expenses of housekeeping are
paid by him, the presumption is that it was the intention of the wife
to make a gift of the profits to the husband. And there is great
reason for this presumption, because the husband being in receipt of
this money, may be induced to live at a greater expense than he
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would otherwise have done, whereby the comforts of the wife, as
well as his own, are increased." A further reason for this rule, as
given in Kittel's Estate, 156 Pa. 453, "is to relieve the necessity
for accounts, which in ordinary conduct of domestic affairs would be
so difficult of determination. In the absence of proof to the con-
trary, it is presumed that the interest money on the wife's separate
estate, which has been received by the husband, has been expended
by him with her consent for the support of herself and family. Since
there was no agreement whatever that the wife was to be paid in-
terest for this money and besides there was no evidence which would
tend towards such an inference, it must be concluded according to
well established principles, that the wife was not entitled to any in-
terest during the lifetime of her husband.
The reason for prohibiting the wife from recovering interest dur-
ing the lifetime of the -husband is that he is presumed to use it for
the benefit of the wife and the family. But after his death must we
continue to apply the rule when the fundamental reason therefor no
longer exists. It does not seem reasonable and justifiable to continue
to apply this presumption and privilege to the personal representa-
tives or distributees of the husband. There is good and sufficient
reason for limiting this exemption to those eases of intimate rela-
tionship such as exist between husband and wife, and upon his death:
the husband's estate should expect no more favors and leniency
from the widow than from strangers. Therefore, the wife should
be allowed interest on the money from the time of her husband's
death. In Wormley's Estate, 137 Pa. 112, "the wife could not claim
interest on the money as she undoubtedly did permit her husband the
use of it without any claim of interest and indirectly, at least,
shared in the benefit derived from its use. She is, of course, entitled
to interest from the time of his death and that must be allowed."
Likewise, "where a wife has a separate estate and it is shown that
the husband has received and appropriated a portion of such estate,
it is a debt to the wife, and he must repay it to her, but without in-
terest unless a contract to pay interest is shown; interest runs, how-
ever, from the time of his death." Brandt's Estate, 11 Lanc. 321.
Consequently, the wife is entitled to interest from the date of her
husband's death and not from the time he received the money.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The judicious and learned opinion of the Orphans' Court makes
a lengthy discussion here unnecessary.
The husband received $1000 belonging to the wife. No explana-
tion of the act is tendered. He must be deemed to have received it
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for her. He might have received it as a gift. But the burden of
showing that he did was upon those who alleged that he did. They
have not done so.
The presumption is that he was expected by her, to use the
proceeds of the money, the interest, in the support of the family.
He is not therefore liable for interest prior to his death.
His support of the family ceased -with his death. It became then
a duty of the administrator to pay interest on the money from the
time of his death until the repayment of the money.
The putting of moneys, on 40 different occasions, into his wife's
hands by means of checks varying from $5 to $100, must be deemed
in the absence of evidence, to have occurred, in pursuance of the
husband's duty to support the family, and to enable the wife to make
the necessary purchases therefor. Appeal dismissed.
ROSS v. CLARK
Statute of Frauds--Act April 26, 1855 P. L. 308-Mortgage-Me-
chanic's Lien
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harrison gave to Clark a mortgage for $6,000, payable in instal-
ments. After the record of this mortgage, and after $2,000 had been
paid by the mortgagee Clark, to Harrison, Harrison caused a house
to be erected on the mortgaged premises, by Ross. Ross would have
filed a lien for the contract price $4,000 but for Clark's asking him
not to, and saying that if he would not, he, Clark would see that
Ross was paid. Thereupon Ross agreed not to file the lien, and the
time for filing passed. This is an action for the $4,000 on Clark's
oral promise.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LEOPOLD, J. We have here to decide whether or not the above
facts create an obligation bringing the agreement within the Statute
of Frauds and Perjuries of 1855. If the agreement is within the
meaning of said statute there can be no recovery, if not, judgment
must be rendered for the plaintiff.
The Statute of Frauds and Perjuries of April 26, 1855 P. L.
308 provides: "No action shall be brought whereby to charge the de-
fendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt or default
of another, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person
by him authorized."
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To determine whether or not the contract is within the statute
we must not look at the mere words of the promise, but we must
also take into consideration the circumstances of the transaction.
Hall v. Trust Co., 220 Pa. 485; Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479.
The recording of Clark's mortgage gave him a prior lien upon
the premises here concerned. The title to the land however was still
in Harrison and he later caused a house to be erected upon the prem-
ises. This he had a just right to do. Now the plaintiff, Ross, erect-
ed the house under a contract with Harrison. Ross was not paid
and clearly had the right to file a lien under the Mechanic's Lien
Act. Now had Ross done what was clearly his right, namely: filed
his mechanic's lien, Clark's mortgage would have lost its priority; as
the mechanic's lien under the above Act clearly takes priority over
any previous lien. Ross did not file his lien, and why not? Was
he guilty of laches? We think not. He was not legally negligent.
He refrained from filing said lien clearly in reliance upon Clark's
oral promise, namely: If Ross would not file the lien he, Clark, would
see that Ross was paid. Now, was this merely an oral promise on
the part of Clark to pay the debt of another? In our opinion it was
far more. As a result of Ross' not filing said lien, Clark received a
benefit and a very direct benefit. His mortgage still remained -
first lien upon the premises, and this we thing was Clark's main ob-
ject in requesting Ross not to file his lien.
In Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, the court says: "When the lead-
ing object of the promisor is to subserve some interest or purpose
of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge the debt
of another, his promise is not within the statute." This, we think,
is directly applicable to the case at bar. Clark's leading object was to
retain his first lien and to accomplish this purpose he had of necessity
to promise to pay the debt of another. The discharge of Harrison's
obligation to Ross was an incidental effect.
In support of this doctrine we would cite: Nugent v. Wolfe, 111
Pa. 471; Baxter v. Hurlburt, 15 Pa. 541; Weber v. Bishop, 12 Super.
51. The facts of this iase are identical with those in the case of Sil-
berstein v. Bernstein, 58 Sup. 375, and in reliance upon the law there
established, and the sound reasoning leading to such conclusion, we
would follow the precedent there established.
We would therefore render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Notwithstanding the elaborate and ingenious argument of the
counsel for the defendant, the opinions of the court below and of
the Superior Court in the case of Silberstein v. Bernstein, 38 Super.
375, vindicate the decision made in this case.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Law of Unincorporated Associations and Similar Relations,
by Sydney R. Wrightington, of the Boston Bar. Little, Brown &
Co., 1916, Boston.
This work deals with associations that are not ordinary part-
nerships, nor corporations. The author, in his preface notices "that
business men are reverting to unincorporated associations to carry
out their purposes," and he endeavors to exhibit the law as to such
associations, in so far as statute or judicial decision, has evolved it.
In 140 pages he treats of Associations for Profit, in 20, Trusts, in 28,
Unassociated Groups, and in 108 Non-profit Associations. In an Ap-
pendix of Forms, notable agreements are given verbatim; such as
that involved in the Standard Oil Trust, the Copley Square Trust,
the Park Square Real Estate Trust, the Boston Personal Property
Trust, the Boston Suburban Electric Companies, the Ludlow Manu-
facturing Associates, the North: American Companies and others.
The subject of this volume is of very great importance, and Mr.
Wrightington's treatment of it is characterized by lucidity, fulness,
accuracy.
The mechanical feature of the books are all that can be desired.
Good paper and clear type, make the use of it a pleasure. It is
worthy of a place in the library of every practicing attorney.
